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“It is the role of people like us to change the parameters of rationalities, 
‘cause it is not enough to have a moral critique of [Western] militarism, 
we need something deeper. We have to pull it out from its roots because 
militarism has become more than a habit, it has become essentialto the 
[Western] political economy”. 
 
Professor Vijay Prashad, Boston (2017) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Places as houses, street markets, urban areas, bedrooms, or rooftops, neither were projected 
nor thought to be as varied asspaces of politicized violence. With the advent of drones it has 
become possible to bring control, death and war even there, with incredible precision and 
minimized effort. HughGusterson (2016)argues “drones have re-spatializedthe concept of war”. 
Likewise,Derek Gregory(2011a)states that with drones new “spatialities of exception” have 
emerged in ordinary life.Grondin (2013) and similarly Graham (2009a) think the traditional 
battlefield has not disappeared, but rather it has become enormously fragmented and has escaped 
from traditional geographical and temporal constraints.Thus, it seems reasonable to problematize 
such assumptions and to look further atdrones and the geopolitical spaces where they interact with 
humans. Three concepts will be essential for disentangling the complex relationship between drone 
warfare and “geo-politics”: first, a space, the battlefield (1); second, an object, the drone (2); and 
third,a practice of security, surveillance and targeted killing (3).  
 
First (1), the research is interested in understanding and deconstructing a specific social 
space, the battlefield.According to theOxford English Dictionary (2018),the “battlefield or 
battleground is the piece of ground where a battle is or was fought”. As noticeable, in this 
proposition the battlefield is not defined as anindeterminate space(i.e. a neutral interval), but rather 
as a precise and localized place, presumably located on the earth, since the Oxford definition speaks 
of a “piece of ground”. Moreover, the verbs’ tenses express that the battlefield is a reality relegated 
to a specific timeframe, which can be either in the past or the present, but forcefully 
requiresalimited temporal configuration.It can be said that the battlefield has not an autonomous or 
natural existence, but rather it is a constructed space, which ownsfirst of alla political and legal 
significance. As a matter of fact, through the inter-subjectivegeographical definition of the 
battlefield, war has beencategorized, distinguished and constrained. The traditional battlefield, like 
the one of Napoleonic wars, has been, over the centuries of military history, a place subject to 
continuous transformations. As reminded by VanCreveld(2008), only in the twentieth century the 
places where battles have been fought are multiples and polymorphous; from the Marne valleys of 
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the First World War to the German cities in the Second, to the forests in Vietnam’s Waruntil the 
urban battles in Iraq; the battlefield has seen enormous metamorphoses and so have the modes of 
fighting too. Indeed, over the years, new participants have populated the traditional battlefield, both 
human (un-lawful combatants, terrorists, partisans, etc.) and non-human (horses, artillery, Panzer, 
airplanes, drones, etc.). The traditional battlefield has been also transferred onto new dimensions, as 
the maritime, the aerial and the digital ones. Thus, it seems inappropriate to think the battlefield as a 
fixed and established location. The battlefield is primarily a conceptual category, and as such it 
operates a communicative distinction (rooted both in practice and language) that in the 
understanding and in the conduct of armed confrontations is a crucial one. Such distinction is 
between the condition of war and that of peace, or between allowable patterns of violence and non-
allowable patterns of violence. The battlefield is also an “imaginary arena” (Megret, 2012), a space 
where individuals or groups of individuals have projected their political entities and power 
ambitions.The battlefield is the place where politics is exceptionally suspended, but it is not absent 
as in the Hobbesian state of nature.The battlefield is a contested and contestable space as humans 
reciprocally project power over it. This is probably the reason why the military literature is rich of 
references as“the domination”, “the control” or the “possession” of the battlefield(Megret, 
2012).Hence, the prism of the battlefield has important implications for the understandingof the 
interrelation between actors, space and violence. Indeed, as held by Frederic Megret (2012) “[…] 
the definition of the battlefield has always been central to the genesis and evolution of the laws of 
war, and the idea of the battlefield captures more of what constitutes war as an activity than many 
other indicators”.  
 
Second (2), the security object under enquiry is the military robotic flying technology 
(UCAV or RPA), also known more commonly as drone (the male of the bee). A military drone is 
generally endowed with cameras for reconnaissance and surveillance operations and equipped with 
missiles (Scorpion and Hellfire types) for targeting missions. Armed drones, so far, have been 
successfully deployed in theatres of asymmetric war, most of the times in the frameworkof 
counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorist (CT) missions. The Israeli Heron and the U.S.-made 
Predator and Reaper models have been the most common used in military operations;even 
though,recently, a plethora of new similar versions of Medium Altitude Long Endurancedrones 
(MALE I and II) have been proliferating around the world (the Chinese Wang II, the Iranian Fotros, 
the Turkish TAI Anka, etc.(Gettinger, 2016)). The Predator drone has been firstly deployed by 
theU.S. army during the Kosovo War in 1999 for preliminary ISR tests(Calhoun, 2016, p. 31). Few 
later, with the beginning of the GWoT, Predator has been weaponized and employed even for target 
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acquisition and killing(Kaag and Kreps, 2014, p. 12). As reported, the U.S., Israeli Defense Forces 
and to some extent the U.K., have made an unparalleled use of drones, especially if compared to the 
sorties of manned aircraft in the same range of time. According to the Stanford & NYU Law School 
archive (2012) only under the first Obama administration drones have made 5162 sorties, during 
whom they have carried out 563 missile strikes. While second Obama’s administration has been 
reported having deployed The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2017) has estimated that drones 
have killed around 9000 people since 2003, among whom at least a thousand of civilians.  
It can be assumed that drones operated for ISR and targeting missions in contested areas 
between rival states have proven to be poorly effective and in some occasions have been promptly 
downed by anti-aircraft systems(BBC, 2017; Kershner, 2018). Indeed, among strategists, it is 
broadly acknowledged that a great-powers war fought with drones is barely imaginable(Freedman, 
2016). Drones are slow aircraft; they are easy to detect even with unsophisticated radar systems and 
they can carry only relatively small weapons. The offensive potential of small weapons carried by a 
military drone, as the Hellfire missile, cannot endanger but a small building or at most an urban 
block. Drones indeed are not mass destruction weapons, but precise and silent killing systems. So, it 
seems misleading to conceive drones as an absolute military breakthrough, because in manycritical 
situations they cannot replace manned airplanes and helicopters. As a mater of fact, traditional 
strategies as manned patrolling, tank invasion and boot on the ground troops, still dominate the 
entire framework of operations and still define the physical existence of a place of battle, otherwise 
called battlefield. 
Rather, it can be held that drones representthe technical accomplishment of the 
radicalization of air power at distance. Indeed, as antecedently recognized by the U.S. Lieutenant 
General Deptula, “drones allow to project power, without projecting vulnerability” (Gusterson, 
2016, p. 22). Endowed with precision, endurance and wide geographical projection, drones can 
primarily target single individuals or small groups of individuals with unique accuracy.Drones are 
the tangible and operational extremity ofa new transforming kind of war,whichis maneuvered 
through a center that connects a network of humans and non-humans.Humans(pilots, data 
inspectors, analysts) and non-humans (sensors, cameras, drones, computers) are all 
interlinkedviasatellites communications, information software, and visual technologies, and 
constitute an operational network where human soldiers are no more physically engaged on the 
battlefront. Labeled by the U.S. Vice Admiral Cebrowskias “Network-centric” (P. W. Singer, 2009, 
p. 16), this warfare is recognized as capable to “translate[s] information superiority into combat 
power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle-space” (Hammes, 2006). Network 
centric warfare has emerged under the momentum of great technological prompt, the latest 
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Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The availability at possessing technological tools as robots 
and software has allowed isolating and defining security threats in an almost scientific manner. The 
environment where securitythreats could displace and move has become the scientific “laboratory” 
of security professionals. 
 
Third (3), the emergence of net-war or network-centric warfare has been the symptomatic 
side-effect of a constant mutation of security practices,manifested progressively since the end of the 
Cold War. Indeed, if on the one hand, information technology has opened up new possibilities 
formaking war more sophisticated, on the other hand the surge of asymmetric conflicts after the end 
of the Cold War has required a re-conceptualization of traditional patterns of security (Holmqvist-
Jonsäter and Coker, 2009, p. 27). Network-centric war has been thought to create an “architecture 
of tools for common situational awareness” to overcome the chaos and “fog of war” typical of the 
asymmetric conflicts(Smith, 2001).Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) hold that net-war differs from 
traditional war as it implies using a network of tools for targeting the constellation of infrastructures 
that sustain the socio-logistical enemy’s power, rather than conquering enemy’s territory.In such a 
context, as Dillon(2007a)explains, 9/11 has marked a radical shift, as the U.S. and its allies have 
had the possibility to deploy an array of advanced technological tools (Balzacq et al., 2010). 
Control cameras, biometric parameters, social-media inspection, algorithmic data analysis,are just 
few among the many instruments of security for scientifically categorize and securitize the enemy. 
They have been tested and extensively applied by the U.S. after 9/11,following the mantra of 
“countering terrorism”. One of the common denominator of all these practices of CT has been the 
increasingly visible transferring of control and violence from national threats to individual 
threats(Dillon, 2002).Similarly, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, technology has allowed to map and 
create an architecture of spatial security all over the Palestinian territory with the aim of securitizing 
each single potential terrorist(Weizman, 2007, p. 241). Since 2004, in the framework of the second 
intifada (after 2000), Israeli Forces have been reported to have used drones in Gaza, Golan Heights 
and West Bank, both for ISR and target acquisition (Currier and Moltke, 2016). 
In the almost hysteric process of distinguishing ordinary men from extremely dangerous 
individuals, the hunt for the “suspected”, the “terrorist” or the “illegal” has brought military 
practices to permeate and invade ordinary life in Western countries, reinforcing the materialization 
of what is identified as the “military-police nexus” (Bachmann et al., 2014). As Didier Bigo claims, 
9/11 has marked the advent of a process of blending between military and police strategies, where 
police tactics have been adopted as war tacticsin international environments. Accordingly, the 
differentiation between “inside” and “outside” spaces of security has beengradually eroded by 
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thenecessity of the “U.S. and its closest allies […] to globalize security” (Bigo and Tsoukala, 
2008a, p. 25). 
In this landscape, droneshave proven to be a fundamental element for data gathering, target 
acquisition and finally quick and silent elimination of the enemy.Drones have demonstrated to 
combine the extraordinary features of robotic weapons for war at distance with theunique “ordering 
capacity” of air power(Neocleous, 2014). It seems, according to Neocleous,that drones have 
beenconceived in the logic of filling the “weapon gap” between war means and international police 
capacity. Drones have thus reflected the increasing necessity to fight “silent”or “shadow” wars, 
small and short segments of COIN and CT displaced across the planet; and most of all to focus on 
individuals, rather than state threats.  
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Research question and research objective 
 
 
The research objective is to analyse how those on the ground (the targeted people) have 
perceived a change in the concept of the battlefield with the advent of drones. If most of the 
researches have devoted more attention to the networks existing between professionals of security 
and objects of security, the present research will seek to focus on the role of targets in the network.  
Hence, the research in a first stage will question if with the advent of military drones the 
battlefield has changed and which forms has assumed such a transformation.Then, in a second 
stage, the research will ask which consequences are in play with the transformation of the 
battlefield and what power relations can be uncovered through an approach that highlights the 
active role of objects. 
 
2.2 Method 
 
The research will interpret drones as “security tools” (Balzacq et al., 2010)through a socio-
material analysis, in order to include material elementsin the analysis of the social process of re-
configuration of thebattlefield(Salter and Mutlu, 2013, p. 423). The goal is to inscribe the study of 
drones and their use by humans as “technologized practices of security” into a relational 
framework, with the aim of evidencing the “relationality” between things and representations 
(Aradau et al., 2014, p. 62). Thus, drones are not considered merely for their kinetic effect of 
lethality, but rather for their power of shaping humanactionsand representations. 
Firstly, the research will study drone warfare as a security practice. The research will trace 
the main element of change that drones bring to the battlefield with their capabilities. Then,the 
research will focus on how the people on the ground conceive drones warfare. It is indeed practice 
that constitutes the main theoretical focus of the present research. Practice, as a form of patterned 
competent performance, is understood as the “explanans” of material and ideational processes that 
“enable structures to remain stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or to transform structures” 
(Adler and Pouliot, 2011, pp. 5–11). As explain Adler and Pouliot(2011, pp. 17–21) “Practice 
develops, diffuses and becomes institutionalized allowing competent performances; it generates 
transformation and sustains or undermines existing power relations”. This choice is justifiable as 
the necessity to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of drones on the “geo-
political” representation of the battlefield, avoiding the rigiddualism between “objectivism” and 
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“subjectivism” (Adler-Nissen, 2012; Bigo, 2011). Comprehensive is interpreted here as not only 
limited to the mere material, technical and tangible effects of drone on the battlefield; rather, it is 
thought to include also the agency of drones on the conceptual, discursive and representational 
transformations occurring in the battlefield, seen by those on the ground(Bigo, 2011). The research 
will analyze the testimonies of those on the ground (militants and civilians), experiencing drone 
warfare. Due to the complexity of achieving a completeset of dataand to the theoretical nature of the 
research, the data sources will be twofold.On the one hand, data will be gathered through structured 
interviews with Palestinian citizens living under Israeli drone surveillance in Gaza Strip. The data 
will be collected through twostructured ethnographic interviews directly carried by the author via 
Skype. The interviews will be conducted through a set of “standardized open-ended questions” 
related to the impressions, perceptions and representations that people living under drones power 
have about the battlefield(Leander, 2008; Turner, 2010). The author will try to provide a co-
produced interpretation of practice in combination with the subjects of the interviews (Bueger, 
2014).On the other hand, nominal qualitative data, will be gathered within academic analyses and 
secondary on-line sources as “field reports” (as the ones ofNew America Foundation Data Site 
(2016), and the Stanford & NYU Law School Report (2012)). As a matter of fact, the 
overwhelming and nowadays crucial presence in the debate of non-traditional sources, mostly 
coming from open on-line platforms, is a sign and symptom of an actual digital shift occurring in 
the overall production of knowledge, especially in relation to “science and technology” topics. It is 
possible to assume that digital knowledge effectively corroborateseven traditional academic studies, 
due to the ineluctable importance ofpictures, video feeds, fictions, official documents and three-
dimensional reconstructioninrepresenting contemporary high-techwarfare.  
Secondly, for operationalizing the analysis of security practices and their political 
significance, the research will deploy Actor Network Theory (ANT) toolkit. The researcher will act 
as a “translator” between the events told by the “people on the ground” and theory (Yanow, 2015, 
p. 401). Accordingly, the research will construct its argument through a semiotic-materialist 
understanding of drone warfare, analysing drones intermediating “agency” on human behaviour, 
thoughts and representation.This choice is motivated by the necessity to overcome the analytical 
hiatus, dominating in IR theories, that distinguishes rigidlybetween material and social forces.The 
research will argue that drones as objects have the power to exercise agency upon the humans on 
the ground as they allow “to enroll or inscribe” such subjects in the network of drones, computers, 
pilots and operators (Latour, 2005, p. 76).Studying drones as “actants” allows avoiding to 
stigmatize the difference between objects and humans and placing both within a common social 
field that ANT calls “network” (Latour, 2005). Technology indeed is not merely passive, but it has 
 11 
“agency” as it has the power to shape social structures and the interactions therein(Leander, 2013). 
As Latour (2005) points out “technology and things can authorize, make possible, encourage, make 
available, allow, influence and suggest” as they have performativity effect that escape human 
intention and control (Leander, 2013). Indeed, even if technology has a defined purpose, this does 
not confine it to serve only that purpose; drones generate new meanings and new knowledge 
through their material agency on human practices and discourses. Drawing from Latour's 
(2005)ANT, Grondin (2011) assumes that “objects have a social life that expands beyond their 
material existence”; indeed objects, despite their material character and their dependence on human 
will, have a “thing-power” (Salter and Mutlu, 2013). Therefore, drones will be studied here as 
“objects”, owing an “agency” capable of affecting human behaviors, power relations, strategies and 
programs for security(Bueger, 2014). The research will identify “the associations (“translation”) 
between “mediators” (human and non-human) for “tracing transformations” occurring in the 
network (Latour, 2005, pp. 102–109). Thus, the research will take drones as the “actants” in a 
framework (or network)of drone warfare practice, for explaining the power “agency” of drones in 
shaping the battlefield from the viewpoint of targets(Amicelle et al., 2015; Salter and Mutlu, 2013). 
This will ultimately serve to uncover the power relations lying in such a re-shaped space: the 
battlefield.  
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
 
 
The present research will mainly draw from critical theory as opposed to problem-solving 
based approaches (Fierke, 2015). It is assumed that critical theory challenges traditional approaches 
to security as it takes new and broader referent objects and different sources of insecurity, 
problematizing the conventional understanding of the term “security” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 
189; Collective, 2006). Indeed, the research will resort particularly to the post-positivist (or post-
naturalist) scholarship focused on drones andgeo-politics, which can be ultimately (and artificially) 
grouped under the critical security studies anthology (Salter and Mutlu, 2013, p. 423).The research 
will analyze the potential transformative impact that drones can have on the traditional battlefield 
through a lens allowing to problematize the objects (drones) as effective social “actants”(Peoples 
and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 61). The overall objective is to contribute to the existing literature 
related to geopolitics and drone warfare, with a deeper focus on the concept of the battlefield and 
the perspective of those passive to drone warfare. It is the problem of a ”change” or a “controversy” 
in a certain practicethat the critical sensibility of critical security studies captures better than other 
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approaches (Aradau et al., 2014, p. 21). Indeed critical analysis is not limited to identifying 
problems, but rather to deconstruct the ways in which things come to be treated as security 
problems.  
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3. Organization of the research 
 
 
The research is organized in four chapters: an introduction, a literature review chapter, a 
third chapter exploring the effective transformations of the battlefield, and finally a fourth chapter 
analysing the political effects of the transformed and reshaped battlefield.  
The first chapter sets out the introductory elements of the research. The second chapter of 
the research seeks to briefly illustrate the existing literature on drone warfare. The third chapter 
descriptively looks at how the battlefield has changed with the advent of drones with the support of 
the data gathered through the Palestinians’interviews. While the fourth chapter bydeploying ANT 
toolkit analyses the “agency” power of drones and their performativity in military-security 
practices. Itultimately attempts to illuminate the consequent physical and conceptual change of the 
contemporary battlefield.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
1. Literature review 
 
 
Drones’seeminglyfuturistic and revolutionary character of killer objects endowed with 
artificial intelligencehas attracted a wide and popular attention. It can be said that, if the prominent 
international newspapers while reporting news from the GWoT have somehow obsessively 
fetishized drones as the expression of the Western techno-military superiority, many among policy-
makers, journalists, activists and academics have engaged in analytical and critical publications 
about military drones.The majority of the literature is characterized by policy-oriented and problem-
solving approaches. Whilst the problematization of drones as objects detached from human agency, 
has only recently been developed by an IR critical stream, which has deployed sociological and 
philosophical theories.  
The “Great drone debate”, as Etzioni (2013) calls it,can be schematically divided in two 
different branches that approach drone warfare through two distinct ontological lenses: a 
positivistor empiricist one(I), seeing drones more as a war tactic, and post-positivistone (II)(Hasian, 
2016). The state-of-the-artis relatively new and thus focuseschiefly on the empirical cases of the 
GWoTnon-conventional battlefields(Mazzetti, 2013).While, little has been written about the shift in 
the Israeli policy of “extra judicial killing” with drone strikes.  
 
The positivistapproach (I) to drone warfare is overall constituted by three main 
theoreticalsub-debates: drones strategic efficiency (1), drone strikes legality(2) and 
dronestrikesethical implications (3).  
 
1.1 The strategic efficacy debate 
 
The first one (1), close to traditional security studiesscholarship,by and large,sees drones as 
revolutionary weapons,conceiving deterministically technological development as a forcefully 
progressive element in war. This debate discusses with a strong anthropocentric view drone actual 
efficacy in counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies (Plaw et al., 2015, pp. 
65–70). Scholars as Cortright(Cortright et al. 2015) andByman (2013) intend the emergence of 
drones as the mark of a positive transformation of classical COIN paradigms and think drones can 
become in a short time the “humanitarian weapon par excellence” (Byman, 2013; Freedman, 2016).  
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Less favorablescholars,as for instance Peter Singer (2009)with his precursory book “Wired 
for War”, fear robotic weapons can lead to an uncontrollable capacity of the military to kill 
everywhere. Experts as Johnston and Sarbahi (2016)and Bergen and Rothenberg (2014, p. 
89)instead warn that, despite drones’ precision, the extensive use of “signature strikes” (targeting 
individuals in accordance to behavioral patterns) can likely promptnew terrorist sympathyamong 
civilians and boost recruitments.On a similar track,Boyle (2010),Kilcullen and Exum (2009)think 
that dronestrikes in the GWoThave been a tactic by the time turned into a strategy, which primarily 
relies on the disconnection from the actual battlefieldand from the local populations,fully missing 
the “hearts and minds” goal. Theyreport that drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistanhave excited 
a visceral opposition among public opinion towards the U.S.resulting in a strong terrorism 
recrudescence (Kilcullen, 2005). This debate, notwithstanding it providescritical viewsabout the 
strikes’ effects on ground people, evidences the “unperceptive acceptance of the way the world 
works” (Booth, 2005, p. 11). Trying to provide explanatoryanswers to empirical problems, those 
scholars tend to propagate a vision of politics that accepts the employment of advanced technology 
for military ends as a natural consequence of human search for security. Traditional security studies 
static view of conflicts as a resultantmanifestation of selfish human nature, compels to see 
technology as a “neutral and unmediatedmeans”(Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008b; Walters, 
2014).Technology is interpreted as an ahistorical force determining straightforward power relations 
only in a mechanic and rational way: those who possess technology are naturally advantaged by it 
and its use. This visionindirectly replicates existing power dynamicsand eventually leads to the 
unchallengedacceptance of drones as the technical by-product of states’ strive for more power and 
security.  
 
1.2 The legal debate 
 
 
The second sub-debate (2)questions drone strikespermissibility from alegal angle. This debate 
identifies controversial legal issues connected to the deployment of drones outside the conventional 
battlefieldfor extrajudicial operations. Indeed, legal scholars are primarily interested in debating if 
the policies of drone extraterritorialkilling comply with the principles of Armed Conflict Law 
(LOAC)(Bergen and Rothenberg, 2014; Brooks, 2013; Cortright et al., 2015; Mazzetti and Apuzzo, 
2015).Two main intertwined controversies are central to this discussion: one related to the status of 
combatants and the other one to character of the conflict.  
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The first controversy revolves aroundthe status of those targeted by drones in countries 
where no armed conflict isdeclared. Indeed, so far, targeting individuals outside hot zones of war 
has been made possible through Special Forces (JSOC and CIA) and exceptional authorizations 
(AUMF) issued by the U.S. government(Plaw et al., 2015, p. 115). This still causesharsh 
disagreement in the scholarship. Supporters of drones strikes legality, as the former CIA director 
John Brennan and the scholar KennethAnderson (2009), maintain that the use of force of the U.S. is 
“consistent with the inherent right of national self-defense against (unlawful) combatants” against 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates (Plaw et al., 2015, p. 113).By contrast,critics as Quigley,Plaw et al., 
(2015, p. 114) argue, for instance, that extrajudicial killings evidently conflict with U.S. Domestic 
Law Executive Order 12333 prohibiting U.S. government representatives “to engage in 
assassinations”.Other scholars as Brooks(2013),O’Connell(2009), Evangelista and Shue (2014) are 
convinced thatdrone strikes undertaken outside declared battlefields are absolutely 
unlawful,because for prosecuting terrorist in peacetime the only applicable law is criminal 
lawalongside Human Rights norms.Calhoun (2016) and Cortright et al. (2015)insist that, especially 
in the so-called “personality strikes”(high-value targets), the lives of dozens or more civilians are 
endangered for killing one suspected, completely disregarding in Bello principles of 
necessity,proportionality and distinction. 
The second controversy relates to theterritorial nature and character of the armed conflict the 
U.S. has fought against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As the Geneva Convention recognizes two kinds 
of armed conflicts: an international in character and non-international one, it seems that the GWoT 
to some extent falls under both (Plaw et al., 2015, p. 130). It is indeed doubtful whether the conflict 
is “non-international”, since the U.S. is the only “State or High Contracting Party” fighting a rival 
non-state armed group,or “international” since the hostilities are in effect not limited to the internal 
territory of one of the parties(Schmitt, 2014).Daskal (2012)conteststhat,given the mobile and 
transnational nature of the enemy (Al-Qaeda),the U.S. has wrongfully applied LOAC even to areas 
other than conflict zonesextending war where the opponents could hide.  
Legal analyses represent the cornerstone of the drone debate as they solidly challenge the 
commonplace that drones are “clean” and “humanitarian” weapons. However, the effect of the 
“interpretative dilemma” on the drone controversies is that hostilities are increasingly unrestricted 
and “the battle-space is expanding” as theorized by Schmitt(2014). Legal approaches to drone 
warfareare limited to the limits that law itself encounters on the international stage. Since 
international norms are often easily distorted to serve politico-military purposes, legal scholars find 
themselves entrenched in the “trap” of differently interpreting law.Indeed, the legal debate strict 
relationship with empirical cases often forces legal scholars totake law as a fixed element. The 
 17 
fixity of law and of its socio-political underpinnings (as the state, combatants and non-combatants, 
sovereignty, institutions), if un-problematized, represent an obstacle to a wider understanding of the 
forces acting in the social world and behind the observable reality. 
 
1.3 The ethical debate 
 
 
The third sub-debate (3) is concerned with the ethics ofdrone warfare. Even if guided by an 
anthropocentric vision of war as a “human against human” activity, this literature raises some 
crucial points of critique. There are indeed three central objections against supporters of 
dronewarfare as Strawser and McMahan (2013), that frame theethical debate. First, drones 
radicalize essential concepts of traditional war such as reciprocity and mutual risk, making it more a 
police action than a political confrontation (Kahn, 2002). Hence, warfare is turned into an 
absolutely asymmetric activity(Finkelstein et al., 2012), whose sense becomes debatable because 
just one side takes all the risks of combat (Calhoun, 2016; Cortright et al., 2015). In this case the 
problem, according to Kahn (2002), lies in the idea that drone warfare is fought with no 
geographical limits as a form of international police. Second, drones effortless and quick killing 
capability can lead politics to mechanisms comparable to a revisited conception of Arendt’s 
“Banality of Evil” (Kaag and Kreps, 2014, p. 121). As a matter of fact, Galliott (2015), Kreps and 
Kaagand to a similar extent the Just War Theorist MichaelWalzer(Cortright et al., 2015), fear thatby 
lowering the barriers of violence and by making war cheap, the likelihood of an ever spreading 
techno-mediated violence is on the horizon. This,in particular, contributes to create an altered-
mindset effect in decision-makers of total reliance on technology, so that the policy of targeted 
killing can soon become not the last resort, but the fastest and “cleanest” choice. Third and last, 
drones are related to the emergence of the so-called soldier PlayStation-mentality. Indeed, 
technology generates a number of intermediations by obscuring the causal chain of responsibility 
and so professional warriorscan convert into alienated operators with a cognitive dissonance from 
the material act of killing(Galliott, 2015, p. 228; Kaag and Kreps, 2014).  
Such a debate seems to incisively enter into unexplored issues about drones and seems to 
follow an important path for deconstructing the taken for granted vision of war of traditional 
security studies. Though, the policy-making oriented approach leads scholars as Kahn and Galliot to 
place drone warfare in a schematic and rigid system of meanings where objects are seen as neutral 
elements only responding to human will. Indeed, those authors see war in a relativized and partial 
way, where the social forces in play are only these enacted by traditional social agents: humans and 
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humanorganizations. Therefore, the debatefails to place and analyze the social role of objects within 
drone warfare, completely underestimating the active capacity of technological toolstoshape human 
representations, identities and sensorial capacities. Moreover, the conception of morality and 
justnessis set in an aseptic reasoning of Just War tradition and this leads to exclude a multitude of 
socio-political variablescomposingcontemporary war.It is indeed informed only by the self-evident, 
visible and “objectifiable” power relations existing in war.Hence, moralityappears to be the 
outcome of a logical and mechanisticunderstanding of war operated only through the tools provided 
by the Western (Anglo-American) philosophicalvalues on ethics(Allinson, 2015).  
 
1.4 Drones problematized as objects 
 
 
The recently grownpost-positivist approach (II), instead,engages with the issue of drones, 
problematizingtechnology, violence and society as intermingling elements of political power. 
Technology results not merely as the sum of a certain tools or as a passive element, rather it is 
understood as it is capable to re-define modes of power and able to shape thoughts, discourses and 
social entities (Bousquet, 2007).This strand of literature deals with the emergence of drones in 
warfare through two distinct objects of analysis: “security discourses” (1) and“security practices” 
(2).  
Analyses related to “discourse”(1)aimpredominantly at understanding how the languages 
about the use high-tech assemblages have served asconstitutor of systems of meaning for justifying 
extraterritorial targeted killing within public opinion.This literature analyses how specific techno-
political narratives have acted as key elements in legitimizing the tendency of war to assume more 
and more an “anthropic-focusedcharacter”. In particularHasian(2016, p. 91), author ofan ample 
research on the narrativessurrounding what he defines the “Post-heroic warfare”, explains how the 
Obama administration has addressed the issue of individual assassinationsas “immunizer and 
sanitizer”for the Westernaudiencefrom the damaging effects of the use of deliberate force.Hasian 
goes further by pointing out that terrorists in such a view represent the pathological “Others”, and 
through a set of codified identifications of them as a “illness”, as the CIA “Orientalist neologism 
AfPak” (Afghan-Pakistani) or “MAM” (Military Age Male), the Western military has constituted 
the “drone speech-act” for performing its power of euphemistic “control and care” (Hasian, 2016, p. 
93). Likewise, the scholar Schwarz (2015)tackles the discourse of U.S.“surgical strikes” and 
criticizes it as the expression of an almost “medical” conception of security, of whom “surgical” 
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isnot only a metaphor, but also crucial constructing element of atherapeutic-militarist 
languagejustifying mechanisms oftechno-bio-politics.  
Resorting to Mbembe (2006) concept of “necro-politics” (administration of politics through 
the binomial of death and life) as an essential “method of life distinction”, Allinson (2015)assumes 
that drones operate on the basis of racial discourses which allow the sovereign powertoapply a 
“racial objectification” of the target. According to Allinson (2015) the purpose ofthis “racial 
objectification” is dominatingthe enemy andadministering the continuation of good forms of life by 
eliminating the dangerous ones. In a slightly different vein, Kyle Grayson (2016), focusing on the 
concept of assassination, tries to understand how the Western politico-cultural system, “in which 
culture operates combined with technology”, has shaped the contemporary strategies of political 
violence,leading to an internalization andneutralization of the policies of targeted killing within the 
public opinion. For Grayson (2016), the Western dominant body of culture,made of scientific 
calculation, statistics andhigh-tech precision, embeds a discourse of perfect and scientific 
security,which renders acceptablewithin Western societies drone warfare. Hence, Grayson 
interprets the language associated to drones as the essential ground for the “problematisation” of 
“insecurity elements” as humanpopulations, human places and human objects. This is why 
Graysonframes the crucial idea of the GWoT as a war where,thanks to technological development 
discourses,the whole conglomeration of violence has beendramatically transferred onto the human 
body(Grayson, 2012). Such a vivid debate, however, misses to entirely catch the material and 
practical aspects that surround and compound drone warfare, limiting the analysis just to a 
discursiveinterpretation of it.  
 
A different strand of the debate(2) deals with the “practices”associated with theuse of drones 
in ISR and targeted killing. In particular, it discusses how effectively contemporary practices of 
political violence enabled by drones have determined a decentralization of warfare from 
conventional battlefield straightly to human beings, human environments and virtual dimensions 
(Der Derian, 2009; Ignatieff, 2000). In such a literature, anyway, it is possible to artificially tracea 
fundamental distinction between two branches,which differently understand and reconstruct 
drones’origin. If most of the authors agree that, with the advent of drones and network-centric 
warfare, violence has been increasingly transferred onto human beings and their intimate 
environments, there exist two different groups that embrace contrasting views on the “genesis” of 
drones.  
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Keener to the first branch (a), Dillon and Reid (2009, p. 146) believe that liberal regimes 
have resorted to symptomatic levels of scientific knowledge to organize and transform their 
strategies for exercising power on human specie threats. Indeed, through “informationalized” 
matrixes of control for the administration of violence, the GWoT has marked “the passage from 
sovereign to disciplinary power” (Allinson, 2015).Somewhat differently, RosiBraidotti (2013) sees 
in the operational dimension of drone warfare the materialization of a “post-human” war, 
becausethe role of technology is essential in allowing to extend violence beyond the body and the 
mind of soldiers, thus escaping temporal and geographical limits of traditional wars. Accordingly, 
drawing from Braidotti’s cyborg-feminist perspective,Wilcox (2016) and Bourke (Blaagaard and 
Tuin, 2014, p. 29)identify in the contemporary acceleration of technology the emergence of more 
functional mechanisms of “bio-political governmentality”.It isprobably from this ground of 
reflections about a “specie life violence”and post-human warfare, that thescholar Weberand the 
philosopher Chamayou (2015) come to define drone warfare as “cynegetic”,namelythe expressionof 
adyadic relationshipbetween“prey” and “hunter”(Weber and Falk, 2017, p. 178).Analyzing the 
performativity of drones as objects,Chamayou and Webercontend that the battlefield in drone 
warfare is reduced to a screen, where pilots visualize an image of the prey, and a mobile “kill box”, 
i.e. the human body of the prey(and herthree-dimensional contingent environment).Such a debate 
opens up new frames for looking at drones. Nonetheless, it can be argued that authors as Dillonand 
Reid or the Post-Human fellowsdo not push their analysesbeyond a brief description of the impact 
of drone warfare on geo-political representations, missing an analysis of power relations inside it. 
The effort of stigmatizing the liber-capitalist political contextwithin which drone warfare has been 
conceived, seems to underestimate the historical role of objects in affecting human practices, 
evenoutside the liberal-capitalist paradigm.  
  
In the second branch (b)authors asGregory(2011b), Grondin (2011), Akhter (2017), Shaw 
(2016) Parks and Kaplan (2017) look at drones warfare practiceexploring the different spatialities 
on which the intermediation of technologypermits to displace power, war and violence. The 
battlefiled, thus, in this scholarship is a central concept, whose declinations are divergent and fluid. 
For instance, Derek Gregory, one of the pioneer in exploring the interconnection between drone 
warfare practices and geography, theorizes that the battlefield has been re-shaped by drones as they 
have allowed to create “punctuated spaces”where the“exception is permanent” and violence 
exceeds any legal and political constraint. Similarly,Shaw (2016) holds that drone warfare as a 
geographically uncontainable activity, has brought “the boundaries of war and politics to collide”.It 
can be said that those authorsshed light on the potential capacity that drone warfare owns in 
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deforming the conventional geographical Cartesian links between sovereignty and territory,which 
have marked the classical geo-politicalcomprehensionofspace over the last centuries(Shaw, 2016).  
In the same branch authors such as Adey et al. (2014), Graham (2009) and Coward, 
stressmore the idea thatstate violence,since the last century, has been subjected toa radical shift 
towards the vertical dimension. Drones representthe latest techno-development in what the architect 
Weizman(2017)defines the “politics of verticality”.In particular, Graham (2009)believes that it is 
exactly in the new anti-terrorist military doctrine adopted by Western states in urban spaces,that 
drones can serve“permanent, vertical, ubiquitous and pre-emptive” patternsof surveillance. And, 
Graham goes on, military practices invade “prosaic and everyday sites of urban life”, transforming 
cities and intimate environments into potential targets of violence. This is the turn of the traditional 
battlefield into something deeper, wider and more simultaneous, thatGraham (2009b) prefers to call 
“boundless and unending battle-space”. The research will seek to follow this strand andcontribute 
tosuch critical geopolitical literature,precisely focusing on the concept of “battlefield”.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
In a first section the chapter will try to briefly outline howmilitary drones have impacted the 
traditional concept of battlefield. While, in the second section, the chapter will use the testimonies 
of “people on the ground” from Gaza Strip, Palestine, for delineating representations and 
conceptions ofthe battlefieldin drone warfare. This will help to understand how people are involved 
in the practice of drone warfare and which relations of power are embedded in that practice.  
 
1. Drones at work:tracing the impacton the battlefield 
 
How is it possible totrace the impact of drones on the battlefield? Assuming as valid the 
analytical recommendation that Actor-Network theorists make, namely “follow the object!” 
(Latour, 2005), drone warfare and the battlefield can be studied through the object itself (the drone 
and its technical capabilities). Drones represent a “crisis of intelligibility” or, sociologically, 
a“change”, a “controversy” in the spatial practice ofair power. This, of course, reflects also on the 
way the people on the ground experience of the battlefield(Basaran et al., 2016, p. 16).Borrowing 
from GregoireChamayou’s analysis, it is possible to distinguish five main characters of drones that 
explain their impact on the traditional battlefield.First,drones are a technology that enables a new 
“politics of verticality”(Weizman, 2007, p. 239).Second,drones “endurance” means an 
extraordinary persistence in terms of surveillance and control on the ground; third,drones and the 
network of tools working with them enable an unparalleled precision in targeting the enemy; fourth, 
drones fully automatic nature distances the attacker and the attacked in a radical way; fifth, 
drones’network implies a substantial problem of distinction between civilians and combatants.  
 
1.1 Verticality 
 
Verticality is a spatial dimension, empowered and mediated by aerial technology. As Adey 
et al. (2014, p. 3) write “seeing from above accounts for the aerial position as an imagined rational, 
scientific and epistemological space: it is a domain of testing, analysis, experimentation and 
exploration”. Verticalityenables two specific modalities of political power: firstly, the power of 
sight, control andsurveillance and, secondly,the power ofperpendicular attack. 
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Firstly, as indeed admitted by British Air Secretary Lord Thomson in 1924, verticality 
allows a vantage point of observation, denying it to all the others(Neocleous, 2014, p. 14). The 
extraordinary power of the “gaze from above”offersa panoptic observational point of view on the 
social life on the ground(Shaw, 2016). The verticalview is revelatory about the essenceof what lies 
below, as it produces a unique knowledge that enables “mastery of space”(O’Tuathail, 1996, p. 19). 
Such point of view from above radically distances the “observer” and the “observed”, putting them 
in an incontrovertible relationship of knowledge asymmetry(O’Tuathail, 1996, p. 8). Asymmetry 
means domination;hence, seeing from above can be translated intoan implicit form of control 
power.As a matter of fact, airplane prototypes proved to be a powerful and cheap method when 
colonial empires tried to map the economic development and the political configuration of the 
“subjugated populations”(Williams, 2013). For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century,the British Royal Flying Corps used aerial photography to improve their geographical 
knowledge of colonial lands.In the Arabian peninsula the “vertical gaze” allowed to re-write the 
geographical representation of unknown large desert areas, where the “pioneer, heroic spirit of 
Victorian explorations” revived with aerial observation and photography(Satia, 2006). Since then, 
throughout the twentieth century, photography and observation from above have represented an 
essential element in “geo-political” knowledge production for governmental scopes. In that sense, 
aviation became a bureaucratic technology for imperial powers. As Edward Said notes “Imperialism 
is after all an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is 
explored, charted and finally brought under control” (O’Tuathail, 1996, p. 11).   
Secondly, whenin 1911 the Italian Lieutenant Gavotti armed for the first time its biplane for 
dropping grenades on the Ottomansin Libya, it appeared immediately evident how verticality could 
work as an extremely functional dimension for coercion (Evangelista, 2016).On the one hand, 
verticality showeda wider way the enemy and the battlefield could be envisioned. Verticality 
allowed to challenge the “planar […] two-dimensional, flat conception of the battlefield”, enlarging 
the battlefield towards a free volumetric three-dimensional space (Adey et al., 2014, pp. 99–113). 
On the other hand,perpendicular attack renderedvain any reaction by those targeted,producing 
demoralization and annihilationon the ground. Indeed, the people on the ground, before the 
development of anti-aircraft artillery, had no means to effectively fightagainst airplanes. Therefore, 
bombing from above acquired an ever-prominent role in countering insurgent populations, 
especially in the colonies. Satia, describing British policies in Iraq in the 20s, reminds that the aerial 
practices of “surveillance” and then of “punishment” through bombardments “were intended as a 
permanent everyday method of colonial administration” (Adey et al., 2014, p. 224; Satia, 2006). 
Accordingly, as Sven Lindqvist (2012, p. 16) and Ingram and Adey et al. (2014, p. 248)aptly 
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demonstrate, the vertical projection of power on the ground with the use of bombs is inseparable 
from a history of intentional production of terror all along the twentieth century. The purpose of 
targeting the enemy’s morale with terror was to provoke a psychological effect of hopelessness and 
impotence. Using aviation has allowed toever morepenetrating places inaccessible to traditional 
ground forces.Air power has permittedthe military to “appropriate”new places as cities, social-
infrastructural “nodes”, and populated areas (Graham, 2004).In a Foucauldian sense, verticality has 
served the specific role of administering and ordering populations through fearanddeath(Adey et al., 
2014, p. 260; Neocleous, 2014, p. 22).As the philosopher Sloterdijk (2009, p. 109) puts it, when in 
the twentieth century “atmo-terrorism” was discovered and tested, “the air totally lost its 
innocence”. 
 
Drones are emblematic technologies for performing the “geo-politics” of violent 
verticality(Graham, 2004; Weizman, 2007). Drones wholly exploit their vertical powerprojection on 
the ground asthey can fly at high altitude(around 24000 feet),enjoying high levels of steadiness and 
escaping the reach of anti-aircraft artillery. From that high altitude they cannonetheless precisely 
attack and use their cameras for surveillance. The drone dominates the fluid volume of air and 
utilizes it as a dimension where freely manoeuvring and offending(Adey et al., 2014, p. 111). 
As Pain (2010) suggests “verticality as a geopolitical site of fear” is impossible to leave in 
oblivion even nowadays. “Geopolitical fears” have historical continuities and reproduce over time 
through certain practices. The verticaldimensionhas often been a collective site of “geopolitical 
fears” constructed and reproduced throughout the twentieth century,with practices of perpendicular 
attack.Drones violent verticality thus does not only imply a mere act of lethal violence; but it also 
implies what Holmqvist (2013) calls the “sensory, affective and embodied practices” that exceed 
the kinetic nature of war. Drones are, therefore, in strict continuity with the history of bombing for 
their strong “fear-impact” on human perceptions and representations of vertical violence: as 
unpredictable, unstoppable and enduring (Sparke, 2008). 
After all, drones have a further capability than other aerial platforms have. Networked 
technologies and drones have used verticality to bring “geo-political” violence straightforward into 
what Pain (2010) defines “micro-scale and everyday sites”. Indeed, when drones are deployed, as it 
has happened on a daily basis in the skies of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Palestine, drones build a 
vertical architecture of constant fear. Such constant fear is not only “geopolitical”, but it also 
penetrates everyday places and quotidian life (80% of strikes in Pakistan hit houses, 70% in 
Gaza(Forensic Architecture Project, 2014, p. 411)). With drones it seems that “geopolitical fears” 
slip into and merge with “everyday fears”, constituting an exceptional space of “everyday 
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geopolitical fears”(Gregory and Pred, 2006, p. 206; Pain and Smith, 2008, p. 18). As Chamayou 
(2015, p. 57) assumes “The conflict zone now goes where they [the preys] go irrespective of 
geography; and the boundaries of the battlefield are not determined by geopolitical lines, but rather 
by the location of the participants in an armed conflict”.   
 
1.2 Persistence 
 
Manned airplanes have for a long time showed their capacity of producing violence only on 
asituational basis. The outcome of airborne attacks has always depended on multiple variablesand 
circumstances. Drones and technologies operating withindrones’ networksreverse the “situational” 
and “temporary” nature of traditional manned aerial warfare. Drones enable unprecedented levels of 
persistence and endurance in security practice, as they are (almost) never tired of flying. Their 
capacity to loiter over targeted areas for 25 hours, as the U.S. Reaper, or for 40 hours, as the Israeli 
Heron, make drones indefatigable combatants. Moreover, increased research in technology, 
especially coming from Israeli Aerospace Industry(IAI) and U.S. Defence Advanced Research 
Project Agency(DARPA), has brought to build a structure of constant control through the 
interexchange of information among station centres, satellites and drones. Indeed, drones have been 
recently equipped with highly precise systems of camera controlprocessinglive stream video 
through satellite signals.Camera’sWide Area Surveillance Persistence (WASP) achievements as the 
U.S.Gorgon-Stare project or its Israeli twin SkEye,have been developed by military research teams 
properly to render drones omniscient objects, capable to spot and track activities on the groundwith 
images of billion pixels (Adey et al., 2014, p. 61; Eshel, 2017). Such programs are systems of 
multiple cameras (around 12-16 single optics) permitting an overall 360 degrees view on the 
ground. WASP systems are able to enact “magnification” (zoom in-out) of the target in an area of 
interest up to 80 square kilometres large, even by night. Israeli SkEye in particular has the singular 
capability to detect human minimal movements also within buildings. While the U.S. 
WASPGorgon-Stare, with the implementation of sensor ARGUS-IS, has recently augmented its 
coverage capability to an area of 100 kilometres square.  
Such systems enable operators (who work for hours focused on a single target) to overcome 
temporal barriers. They allow to trace back tothe origin each movement of the target, registering 
data automatically through a so-called “backtracking capability”(Eshel, 2017; Gregory, 2013). For 
instance, U.S. operators at the Control and Management Centre in Creech, Nevada,can enter with 
powerful zoom toolswithin “multiple areas of interests recorded by the drone simultaneously, 
without neglecting the general area”(Eshel, 2017). Those systems are also equipped with “fully-
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programmable alertingmechanisms” that notify operators unusual or suspicious events through a 
specific “Human Tracking Reliever Software”(Eshel, 2017).As acknowledges U.S. Major General 
Barclay, persistence of control directlyresponds to “a persistence status of threat that requireswhat 
is known as a Full Spectrum Dominance of the battlefieldin [this] era of persistent conflict” (U.S. 
UAS Roadmap, 2010; Shaw, 2016, p. 16).  
 
1.3 Military Precision 
 
It is widely recognized that drones are precise killers, as they depend on precise networks of 
intelligence and they use high-tech weaponizedsystems. Dronesprecision, nevertheless,is a form of 
illusoryprecision. It is embedded in the military logic of cyclical, rational and computational 
analysis of data. It is hence not a comprehensiveform of precision, since mistakes and 
miscalculations often occur; but, rather, it is a standardizedform of precision that works along 
chains of repetitive actions.Such military drone precisioncan beexplained throughthree different 
operative patterns that work in drone networks.First,the way targets are researched and 
listed;second,the way targets are shownand seen through visual technologies; and, third, the way 
targets are attacked. 
First, for identifying potential targets the U.S. CTapparatus has used a complex web of inter-
operative tools. U.S. CT since 2009 has disposed of a compound of Security Agencies for 
scientifically enlist terrorists, affiliates and potential militants, following the doctrine of “find, fix 
finish the target”(Scahill, 2016, p. 40).Sophisticated interrogations, cyber spying and surveillance 
practices (as “Cyber-Hawk”, Dirt-Boxes”, “Eavesdropping software” on calls and messages, etc.) 
have empowered algorithmic systems for definingstatistical regularities, patterns and correlations 
among thedata gathered on suspected people(Scahill, 2016, p. 31; Shaw, 2016).The precision of 
such methods of investigation has led to track entire transnational terrorist networks and focus not 
only on high rank figures, but also on mid-low rank militants.The outcome has been the 
construction of digital archives of names all interconnected and constantly uploaded. For instance, 
in the U.S. CT such kind of database,known as “Disposition Matrix”, has been compiled by NSA, 
CIA and JSOC with shared information(Gettinger, 2015). A constant monitoring of mobile phones 
cells (through surveillance of SIM cards geo-location) and inspection of social media with “Nexus 
Topography”,have contributed to locate individuals and trace their quotidian activities(Dodson and 
Officer, 2006). This, explains the journalist Scahill (2016, p. 36), over the years has led theU.S. 
intelligence to compose a “killable terrorist watch list” comprising around 680,000 names 
globally.IsraeliIntelligence and Defense Forces (IDF) have worked similarly. Since the beginning of 
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the Second Intifada Israeli ISNU (“U8200” department)hasre-organized the way of operating. It has 
specialized in conducing whatin Hebrew are known as “Sikum” or “preventive, offensive counter-
terrorist tactic surgical by definition of targeted killing” (David, 2003; Stahl, 2010). ISNU has 
combined HUMINT methods, as interrogations and espionage, withSIGNT methods as control of 
phone-calls, movements, bank transactions,and behavioral patterns in orderto enlist Hamas leading 
figures(Falk, 2015; Reed, 2015).  
Second,the available technology allows high levels of precision in terms of visualization of 
the enemy during the phase of “fixing the target”. High-techvisual technologiesbroadcast real time 
video and can be so accurate that the battlefield for U.S. operators is wholly transferred on a virtual 
dimension.In effect, networked military technologies turn the battlefield into a screen-sized video-
feed (Der Derian, 2009, p. 281). On the screen, operators have the power to pause or rewind the 
events of war and to scan them with extreme precision.The visualization of waris completely 
reshaped, since the battlefield is visualized as a footage sequence corroborated byindicators, 
temporal indexes and spatial coordinates. With such avant-garde “visuality”, operators acquirean 
almost totalized knowledge of the battlefield, as they can scientificallyfollow and pinpoint targets, 
makingextremely precisedamage assessments(Adey et al., 2014, p. 104).  
Third,when it comes to “finishing the target”. Drones network relies on an unprecedented 
precision due tothe interaction between GPS satellites systems and laser-guided ammunitions as 
JDAM systems (Locatelli, 2010, p. 120). AsMALE drones are extremely steady platforms, for 
operators it is possible to calibrate with almost micro-scale precision the expected targetedarea and 
the potential impact of the missile. U.S. “Hellfire”,“Scorpion”, and Israeli “Spike”are relatively 
small guided missiles with an overall limited range of blast.As demonstrated by Forensic 
Architecture Project (2014, p. 409), GPS laser-guided missileshave different radiuses of 
fragmentation and this allows drone operators to esteem precisely the effect of strikes. They can 
target even people and objects moving at high speed, as missile radar signal is interconnected with 
the network GPS signal (Keller, 2017). 
Consequently, thebattlefield is not only relegated to be the place where kinetic violence 
materializes. But rather it is stretched and displacedin different locations.The battlefield indeed 
extends at the CIA, NSA or ISNU headquarters, at Ramstein satellite uplink European Center in 
Germany, at the bases where drones are piloted, on computer screens and all along the chains that 
compound the CT network(Scahill, 2016, p. 73). In effect, the battlefield beginswhen intelligence 
operators start suspecting about an individual and put him on the “killable watch list”. And, 
probably,itends right on the body of the targeted individual when the body is obliterated.Eventually, 
Grondin (2011) thinks the GWoT security practices have distanced and decentralized violence from 
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the “traditional planar battlefield” and brought it to different places“where control and 
precisionhave been more efficient, scientific and, paradoxically, less visible”.  
 
1.4 Distance 
 
By transferring part of the combat on the screens of operators it is possible to assume that 
traditional“reciprocity of war” ceases completely to exist in a physical sense in drone 
warfare(Chamayou and Clausewitz, 2006, p. 82). What drones do is to radicalize distance between 
combatants. They make war available from safe places afar from the real battlefield.Human 
presence is completely mediated by the network of technologies; and alsodeath, sufferance and 
fearare no more a collective experience, but rather a lonely moment for the targeted and its 
relatives. Drones operators’ perceptions about death, destruction, sounds of explosion and 
bombardment are transposed by visual technologies. Ignatieff (2000,pp. 163–169)says that when in 
1999 in Kosovo the U.S. could use high levels of accuracy from an exceptional geographical 
distance, the nature and objective of combat changed. There, the advent of RMA,consisting in 
visual and networked technologies, allowed to surgically target only “society’s nervous centers”, 
making Kosovo the embryonic form of what Ignatieffterms “virtual war”.Technology reports with 
extreme speed a re-elaborated virtual reality, where the sensorialexperiences of war are completely 
re-shaped and presented to humans under a new form. Bodies are reduced to small dark figures 
(resembling videogames characters); houses and districts account as the undistinguishable backdrop 
of a picture; and the effect of a bomb blasting is just a small fading smoke cloud. Technology sets 
off what Agius (2017)defines a “techno-cultural” operation of spatial-temporal compression 
between the observer and the observed. On the one hand, indeed, thanks to the network, operators 
are so close to the area they are “fighting” within that they know scientifically the most intimate 
details of the battlefield.On the other hand, they are physicallydetached from the space where 
violence is liberated. This breaks down the logical causality of violence and its social significance. 
In this manner technology does not only operate a mediation ofthe material reality; but also operates 
on a conceptual scale, mediating the action-reactionrelation between violence and its producer. 
Graham defines this process an effect of “distantiation proximity”; in other words the fact that 
operators are connected to the battlefield, but are simultaneously detached from the battlefieldsocial 
reality.The networkprovokes a rupture on the chain of causality of violence. Thisrupture between 
“watcher” and “observed”, “killer” and “killed” makes the distance not only a physical distance, but 
also a social distance. The final effect is to distance the centre of violent power and the subjects of 
suchviolent power and put them into separate social realities.  
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1.5 Distinction 
 
 
Even though praised by some Military Ethicsscholars as “humanitarian weapons”, drones, as 
data support,have procured high numbers of civilians and “unidentified” causalities(Evangelista, 
2016). The “grey area” of law that defines what constitutes a military target remains still vague and 
misinterpreted even with the advent of drones(Evangelista, 2016). Drones are indeed part of the CT 
“weaponry assemblage” of the epoch of terror(Dillon, 2007b).As the effort of CT has been to find 
potential individual terroristicthreats, drones have served the purposes of CT policies. CT has thus 
centred its aims at distinguishing in a pre-emptive way between threats and non-threats. Pre-
emption has been the overarching criterion of functioning for CT. Terrorism indeed exploits the 
possibility to merge and confuse with the civilian realm and to penetrate societal vulnerabilities 
only when a contingency opens up (Dillon, 2007b). The main rationale of CT network, of which 
drones are an integrative part, has been to target threats before they could become effective. 
Identifying a “terrorist threat” has meant analysing behaviours, personal ties, relationships, 
ideological positioning, potentiality of offense and a multitude of other criteria. Therefore, in order 
to be as much functional as possible, CT network has forcefully overcome the distinction between 
civilians and combatants that could be ontologically an obstacle for finding pre-emptively the 
terrorist. Thus, with CT policiesthe actor to securitize has shifted from the soldier intended in a geo-
political sense (as the hostile agent of an opposing territorial actor) to the “individual bio-political 
threat”(i.e. the terrorist). Being a combatant has ceased to be recognized as a reciprocal status. In 
the war on terror it has been a competence of CT apparatuses to unilaterally decide who was a 
“threat” and who was not a “threat” according to certain criteria. Certainly, one may argue that 
when a militant decides to affiliate or join a terrorist group that is known for illicit activities, he 
makes an aware choice to be a terrorist and thus a potential target. The issue, however, is much 
more complex than it seems if explained so. What constitutes a “bio-political threat” is different 
from what constitutes a “geo-political enemy”. The definition of enmity/amity is limited to a 
spatial-temporal geo-political area, namely the area of the battlefield. Instead, being a “bio-political 
threat” means “being a threatening form of life”, as Dillon (2007b) puts it. Or it means being a 
“killable person” in drone jargon. Consequently, as life is taken as the referent object of such “bio-
political” practice for securitizing terror, life itself must be extinguished in the name of positive life 
survival against terror (Dillon, 2007b). As a matter of fact, John O. Brennan (2012), Chief of CT 
under first Obama’s presidency, once said “TheAmerican people expect us to use advanced 
technologies […] to remove terrorists from the battlefield”. It seems that such Brennan wanted to 
mean that in CT the battlefield is no more the place of combatants;but it has potentially become the 
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place of everyone.And the purpose of CT is not targeting the “geo-political enemy”, but removing 
the “bio-political threat” from the battlefield. And in this conception, the battlefield is not limited to 
the place where the enemy is geographically present. Rather, the battlefield is an indefinite “geo-
political”space wherethe objective is to remove “bio-political threats” (i.e. terrorists).  
In drones warfare“geo-politics” and “bio-politics” are not separated forms of power. Rather, 
bio-politics is organized and exercised in a reshaped territoriality, where the geo-political 
distinction between combatants and civilians no longer applies. Drones practices of securityaim to 
transform the “geo-political” action into a form of “bio-political” control. This is probably the 
reason why “high value targets” are so important that for destroying them the U.S. CT and even 
IDF have been disposed to disregard the basic principles of LOAC. Indeed, for catching high-rank 
figures of Al-Qaeda and Hamas, the potential death of their relatives, children, women and 
neighbors has been deemed as a “necessary” security measure. Women, children and relatives have 
been often obliterated in drone strikes and have been calculated as “legitimate collateral damage”, 
or, even worse, “as willing human shields”(Weizman, 2007, p. 245).  
 
Eventually, the battlefield is no more limited to military places. The battlefield is where the 
threat is still alive. This is why networks enable drones to get so close to the “everyday life” of the 
target that they “compulsorily” hit houses, urban districts and civil buildings. Terror is essentially 
different from war as a category. As Dillon (2007b) explains, “in a terror age the logic of threat 
installed by liberal bio-politics of security is ultimately not that of an externalized enemy. Neither 
another competitive state, nor an existential other form of life, the threat to life in the liberal 
struggle bio-politically to secure life becomes life itself, the very means which lifelike properties 
circulate and propagate”. 
It is in through this new formulation of securitizing actors (i.e. terrorists) that drones have 
found their logical rationale for being increasingly deployed. Such logic has transformed death into 
a pre-emptive justified security measure. As Chamayou (2015, p. 146) provocatively asserts “the 
targets are presumed guilty until they are proved innocent – which however can only be done 
posthumously”. This is the reason why the research in the following pages will not distinguish 
between civilians and combatants, but rather it will write about “the people on the ground”.1 
 
                                                        
1Calling generically “people on the ground” may appear as an imprecise definition, lacking of academic accuracy. The research, however, wittingly 
chooses such a definition for two reasons. First, distinguishing between civilians and combatants is a hard task in drone strikes due to the blend 
between those presumed as militants and those not (data confirm such controversy), and there exists the risk to politicize the issue. Second, the 
research has the purpose to insist on the concept that the battlefield is a moving-stretchable space that can involve everyone if deemed target. 
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2. Drone battlefield from the peopleon the ground perspective 
 
 
Attention has been devoted to the perceptions of“the people on the ground” in relation to the 
cases of Afghanistan and Pakistan drone strikes. As the “Living Under Drones” report tells, 
civilians of Afghan-Pakistani border regions, where most of theGWoT strikes between 2008 and 
2013 have taken place,describe experiences of injuries, destruction and fear(Knuckey et al., 2012, p. 
66). The interviewees evoke the impact that strikes have had upon their quotidian life. Their 
testimonies drawa much more different picture of drone warfare, than what is generally depicted in 
ethical and juridical publications. On the one hand, testimonies recount the disruptive effect of 
strikes on the life of survivors. Injured people, including children, are mostly excluded from 
education and working life, as their disability prevent them from moving. Widows and orphans are 
relegated to a status of extreme poverty, as their household cannot continue without men. Injured 
often cannot afford specific surgical treatments for their severe wounds. Similarly, prostheses and 
cares for people mutilated by drones are too expensive for public health care systems and people are 
so poor that cannot pay by themselves. On the other hand,interviewees speak of the constant levels 
of fear that drone strikes witnesses should face everyday.Adults, teenagers and even children are all 
frightened to be the “next victim of a drone attack, especially by night” (Knuckey et al., 2012, p. 
66). Indeed, the hovering of drones for hours over the villages of North Waziristan or FATA 
regions, Pakistan, cause mental diseases and psychological disorders to those on the ground. The 
testimonies tell of an enduring status of anxiety, in particular for the people who physically attended 
a strike. The tremendous sense of helplessness and despair affects in a pervasive way ordinary life 
and social activities. As one of the youngest testimonies says “We were all busy. But since drones 
have started […] everyone is terrorized […] you feel death is so close that you don’t want to study” 
(Knuckey et al., 2012, p. 149).A psychiatrist treating people with drone post-traumatic disorders 
and stress says that the people suffer from forms of “anticipatory fears”, common in conflict zones 
due to the“uncontrollability” of future events (Knuckey et al., 2012, p. 81). Such people, in most of 
the cases teenagers and women, feel to be included into a “never-ending battlefield” as potential 
targets. As a matter of fact, they explain that drones are different from traditional military forces, as 
they seem a “deus ex machina”, acting independently and unpredictably from political will. The 
activist Medea Benjamin (Ehrenreich, 2013, p. 102) writes that the greatest fear that people feel in 
Pakistani FATA region is that drones can target anyone wherever he is, even in houses, workplaces 
or medical clinics.  
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Lesser attention has been however dedicated to Palestinian territories as a case of vertical 
architecture of drone surveillance and attack. Even in Gaza Strip,indeed, “drones shape life beneath 
them” (Wilson, 2011).As Weizman (2007, p. 237)points out in studying Israeli occupation of 
Palestine, even if soldiers are out from Gaza since 2005, IDF fully controls Palestinian aerial 
sovereignty. This, in the context of the outbreak of the second Intifada, resulted in the emergence of 
a new dimension of war in the Israeli-Arab conflict: aerial space. As Israelis have retained exclusive 
control upon Palestinian skies, formalized during Oslo agreements, IDF has had the possibility to 
vertically dominate Palestinian territories and the life below(Weizman, 2007, p. 239; Wilson, 2011).  
Culminated with the establishment of an “iron dome”, IDF has used the aerial dimension 
and specifically drones for a range of different security practices(Human Rights Watch, 
2009).Israeli security apparatus has deployed drones as multirole operatorsin surveillance, 
protesters dispersion and finally targeted killing.Israeli authorities still claim secrecy for IDF drone 
program, but many independent groups and journalists are convinced and have proofs that IDF 
drones have constantly fired missiles both in West Bank and Gaza Strip (Currier and Moltke, 2016; 
Human Rights Watch, 2009).  
 
2.1 Testimonies from Gaza Strip 
 
 
The author of the present research has carried out the interviews with structured questions 
about drones and the battlefield to Palestinians, currently resident in Amman, Jordan. The first 
interviewee, named Ahmed(2018) is a 25 years old Palestinian male. 2 When asked about his 
knowledge concerning IDF drones, and how he did come to know drones, Testimony One (Ahmed) 
answer is that he only knows that drones have powerful cameras and some are lethal. While, when 
asked which is the general knowledge among his relatives and friends about drones,Testimony One 
(Ahmed) refers: 
 
We don’t know much about IDF arms, sometimes new weapons are deployed and we notice it 
lately.We knew more when Palestinian students were killed in 2008’s incident. We know anyhow 
that the one that flies high and you can hear the propeller, is lethal. A peasant friend of my friend 
was killed [in BeitHanun] close to his farm and since then we all fear drones. He was found in 
small flash pieces, there was no doubt it was a small missile coming from adrone. […]People 
complain that drones shape life in Gaza Strip. In effect they cause a lot of fear and they also 
interfere often with TV signal and smartphones. They are also used for firing trees, plants and 
agriculture becausemissiles pollute land. We discovered pieces of small projectiles close to olives 
                                                        
2He did not specify his current work position; he only reported that in Gaza he was employed.  
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and other trees. They surely belonged to armed drones. They [IDF] target plants because they 
know chemicals present in the missile affect the land.  
 
Testimony Two Nabil (2018), 31 years old male, blogger and journalist, explains that the 
general and popular consideration about drones among his friends, relatives and neighbors is that 
they are noisy and dangerous,“as unknown animals”. Testimony Twoin relation to the feelings of 
being under drone controlreports that he perceives to be under constant pressure due to unawareness 
of the unbound spatiality of potential drone attacks. He cares about the color of clothes he wears, 
the way he walks in the street, the places to go at certain time and even if using his car or not. All 
the testimonies agree in saying that “hearing the buzz of a drone is strictly associated with an 
unconscious and uncontrollable feeling of fear” (Ahmed and Nabil, 2018). 
If Testimony One says that he tries not to really care about drones at the end of the day, 
since he hopes drones just spy; Testimony Two reports to beafraid as drones enact a constant status 
of threat. He recognizes that drones effectively build an “architecture” of control that humans are 
forced to live with. And he tells:  
 
When you hear a drone you cannot sleep or work, you just think “In Shaa Allah” not to be hit. 
When you are in the street you know you should walk under balconies. […]My children when hear 
“buzz” come to our [parental] room because they are afraid. You don’t know; maybe they [Israeli 
forces] have confused you. Or your identity with the neighbour and then you become the terrorist 
just because you walk alone in the countryside. Maybe you don’t know what your brother did, 
maybe a friend of him is linked to wrong people. Especially now, everyone needs to be controlled, 
with protests all Palestinians are always [deemed] dangerous in advance. If you are a male, then 
you have to have really fear. […] In 2014 escalation of conflict, drones were used to target the 
roof of buildings as an advertisement before F-16 strikes demolishing houses. After that, drones 
have always been associated with the terror of “my house can be the next”.   
 
As the story of Testimony Two explains, the CT network continuously looks for potential 
“life threats”. And every male in military age (codified by theIDF and U.S. Air Forcewith 
theacronym MAM) is a potential target when a drone is looking for “life threats”. On the point, 
there is arelevantissue raised by Testimony One. IndeedAhmed(2018)believesthat ordinary people 
cannot know how to protect themselves because there is no actual “safe place” in Gaza. In relation 
to “the spatiliaty of drone control”he asserts:  
 
When you hear drones flying you think that they can make fire wherever they want because they 
are just iron airplanes and they have no fear. Well, F-16s are more scaring and more powerful, 
but drones are more insidious, like mosquitos they persecute you. Drones follow people. I’m 
certain of this. You have no power to fight drones, I’m certain they know everything of us. The 
“spatiality of drone” is not easy to describe; anyway even when you don’t hear the “buzz”, you 
know they are there. The “buzz” makes only fear more real, but drones are always there in the sky 
because they are cheap for IDF.[Referring to the drone] In the sky you can go everywhere in few 
seconds, you are faster than people. This is what frightens people. Children are so, so afraid at 
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school. They report that when hearing the “buzz” they do not feel to be in class anymore and feel 
to be in another place.  
 
On the same point,Testimony Two Nabil (2018) then reports:  
 
The perception is that anyone can be targeted, even “pure civilians”. You think that they can see 
everything and you fear to do something wrong that the drone can see. It’s exactly like they Eye of 
God. You are afraid to talk to people by the street, to help people, to have friends, to go to some 
places. Israelis say that you have to behave well if you want to live well. We feel controlled. It’s 
not a matter of privacy (privacy is luxury in Palestine), [rather] it’s matter of people freedom.  
 
Testimony Two effectively explains that it is drones verticality and persistence that make 
them a permanent presence among people in Gaza Strip. Their omniscient capacity is frightening 
and they continuously bring people under the inspection ofIDFCT network. People on the ground 
are unaware of the drone network of control, as it is a sort of military-policearchitecture of 
surveillance. This eventually makes people living on a permanent social-edge of insecurity and 
impotence. The edge is an indefinite space where they do not enjoy a real status as“civilians” or 
“combatants”, but rather they are simply people on the ground, constantly under surveillance. What 
emerges is a sense of routinized alienation with respect to the networked technologies that enable 
drones to control Gaza Strip. What the testimonies talk about is not a securitized or controlled urban 
area, but rather a form of urbanized battlefield. The battlefield shouldbe, on the contrary, an 
exceptional space. While, instead, it is brought into a quotidian spatial-temporal dimension with 
whom people on the ground are forced to coexist everyday.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
The final chapter will interpretatively analyze the data gathered with interviews. Here Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) core tenets will be deployed not as a mere framework for analysis, but 
rather as a lens for looking at the web of interconnections between humans and objects present in 
drone warfare.  
 
 
1. What is Actor-Network Theory? 
 
 
In a nutshell, ANT is a sociological theory of relationalassociation,which studies the 
intermediating effect of technology in social activities(Crawford, 2005). However, as ANT 
proponents strongly recommend,3ANT should not be intended simplistically as a theory,since it is 
not properly “hierarchical” to the empirical reality as other theories are. Indeed, ANT does not 
provide with a real framework wherein putting data and from which obtaining interpretive results. It 
rather is a “way for lookingfrom a different perspective”, that should bealways adapted to each 
empirical case under enquiry. As Latour (2005, p. 126) writes, each empirical case that involves the 
presence of a network is not necessarily an example of how ANT works.Rather,ANT is an occasion 
to spot a “controversy”in the structures of the social world where “materialities” (or objects) play a 
relevant role into network formations. For ANT there is not an ontological fixed reality, but infinite 
complex social formations made out of “associations”. 
Accordingly, what is remarkable with ANT is the focus on“materialities”presentin the social 
world. ANT is rooted in a “relational”traditionthat establishes a symmetrical ontological 
understanding of humans and non-humans entities(Balzacq and Cavelty, 2016).The cardinal 
principle of ANT is the principle of “generalized symmetry”, which means “that non-humans and 
humans should be integrated in the same conceptual framework and assigned equal amount of 
agency” (Cressman, 2009). Indeed, ANT conceives that technology does not exist outside the social 
world as an autonomous entity; but rather it impacts and shapes the social world as an active 
participant(Latour, 2006, p. 128). ANT is a practical optic to liberate the analysis of the social from 
human-agency focused approaches and from the strict dichotomies “nature/society” and 
“agency/structure” (Balzacq and Cavelty, 2016). 
“Actors”and “networks” are key elements of ANT. Every “actor” is not simply the function 
it performs; but it can entail in itself other performances, other networksand other 
                                                        
3The present research draws mainly from ANT insights coming from the works of Bruno Latour (2005) and John Law (1999).  
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association(Latour, 1996).There are,nonetheless,specific types of “actors” that are defined by 
ANTas “actants”. “Actants”are“actors” that can change practices and can render performances 
more visible. “Actants” are “mediators” or “translators” of practices in network formations(Latour, 
2005, p. 65). Whereas, a“network”is every kind of relational structure of the social world in which 
“actors” are interconnected. A “network” is a heterogeneous social aggregation of “actors” that 
have a common end and are empowered by their connections. The expression “heterogeneous”aims 
at implying in ANT every element that exists both in nature and society. Examples can bebodies, 
signs, electromagnetic waves, ideas, natural features, devices or forms of violence.  
Furthermore, there is an essential concept for studying  “actors” and “networks”that ANT 
employs: the concept of “translation”. “Translation” refers to the process of “modification 
throughconnections”, or,put simply, to the process of performance that an “actor”enactsin a 
“network”(Barry, 2013). It consists of creating “convergences and homologies” between two actors, 
explainsLatour (2005, p. 22). In other words, when a technical practice is performed, a meaning is 
translated from an actor to one another. Consequently, the technical and the social co-constitute 
each other with new translated meanings. “Translation” is a form of power in which an “actor” 
transports a meaning, an impulse, “inducing two mediators into coexisting and connecting” 
practices (Latour, 2005, p. 57).Indeed, “translation” is the concept through which ANT can 
disentangle power relations (Müller, 2015). “Translation” is a process that can occur at any scalar 
level, from the “micro” to the “macro” and can circulate along “networks” from the “micro” to the 
“macro” and vice-versa. The multiple scalability of ANT allows tracing“networks” aggregations at 
many different spatial levels simultaneously. Hence, ANT does not conceive temporal or 
geographical traditional constraints. “Translation” is concept that transcends the boundaries of 
subjective knowledge.  
 
Even if not thought as a geographical theory, ANT has an inner proclivity to be instructive 
in terms of the relation between space and “actors”(Murdoch, 2006, p. 79).ANT permits to get rid 
of the tyranny of traditional geopolitics and its main concepts as distance, proximity, landlocked, 
and others (Law and Hassard, 1999, p. 16). For ANT space is nor social neither real. Space in ANT 
(in order to be mapped and defined) is the by-product of “association”. Indeed, one essential point 
stressed by Latour (1996)is that the “network” functions through the circulation of competences, 
actions or more generally knowledge. The power relations that ANT wants to study as 
“associations” are traceable within movements across space. ANT defines the objects within the 
“network”as “immutable mobiles”, as they don’t change, but they move and need spaces to perform 
their ends. In ANT space becomes not a “container” of “actors” but a “relational product” of 
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“actors” associations (Murdoch, 2006, p. 16). From this starting point, ANT indirectly questions the 
a priorigeographical scales (as state, region, sovereignty, global, local, etc.) used for instance by IR 
and Security Studies for looking at “spatialities of power”. Therefore, ANT assumes that space is 
simply “made out of the flows that involve objects through interconnectivity” (Müller, 2015). As 
Murdoch (2006, p. 15) points out “relational space is power-filled space where some alignments 
come to dominate […] while other come to be dominated”.   
Such perspective is useful to show how “networks” come into existence out of certain 
associations that transport power impulses. Therefore, ANT can be seen as a lens through which 
studying relations, connections and transformations occurring in networked structures where even 
objects have agency. Even if objects cannot be at the origin of social activities, they at least 
“express power relations, symbolize social hierarchies, reinforce social inequalities, transport social 
power and reify gender relations” (Latour, 2005, p. 72). Finally ANT, asit can serve to see from a 
different perspective the associations of elements, is a theoretical instrument to explore how 
networks generate effects of order, disorder, power, organization or inequality (Law, 1999). As 
matter of fact, in a Foucauldianguise, power is interpreted by ANT as an effect rather than a cause 
of social processes (power understood not asin potentia, but in actu). Nevertheless, differently from 
Foucault, ANT focuses more on material or empirical processes of spatial translation of power, 
rather than on discursive processes of spatial translation(Murdoch, 2006, p. 29).  
 
 
2. Applying Actor-Network Theory to drone warfare 
 
 
ANT can be applied to drone warfare, as drones are crucial objects of security in 
networkswhere technologies and humans operate together. ANT, however, should not berelegated 
to be a descriptive tool of how a dronenetwork is structured. Indeed, using ANT just to highlight 
that drones operate in technological networks where humans and non-humans can be studied 
symmetrically,seemsto be obvious and redundant. Similarly, saying that the CT apparatuses that 
employ drones work in a networked fashion, is not something new.  
ANT, instead, encourages to dig deeper in order to study the “network”as a concept and not 
as a thing(Latour, 2005, p. 131). ANT provides a different way for understanding power relations 
functioning within“networks” and focuses on the unconventional spaces where the “network” 
works. It is the geographical configuration that makes the techno-human “network” something 
worth to be studied. Therefore, drones can be analyzed as “actants”or mediators in the spatial 
“network”where pilots and the people on the ground are inscribed together. Drones are capable to 
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circulate practices from long distances and across diverse scales, intimately connecting operators to 
the people on the ground in real time. It appears here clearer than before, how technology is not 
neutral, but rather fully political, as it is a mediator that “translates” certain meanings and actions 
into political practices(Barry, 2001, p. 16). 
The drone battlefield can be studied with ANT through two stages.In the first stage, 
dronesshould be looked though the association they create withthe “translation” of impulses. While, 
in thesecond stage, dronesshould be studied for the new“spatialities” theydefine. Drones, in 
effects,create new object-defined spaces, where certain actions are rendered possible and certain 
power relations are reproduced. Such spaces are not the flat places that pertain to our traditional 
geographical understanding. Rather, such spaces are “translation zones” where political processes 
are rendered possible by objects (Barry, 2013). 
 
2.1 The concept of “association” 
 
 
Starting from the assertions made by Palestinians during the interviewsthat they feel to be 
excluded from drones network and that they fear dronesas they don’t know their intentions, it is 
possible to deploy ANT concept of “association” (Müller, 2015). The concept of “association” or 
the French version of “agancement” (coined by Deleuze in relation to “assemblages”) express the 
way the “network” expands through an extension of its “agency”power towards another actor 
(Müller, 2015).  
When Palestinians Ahmed and Nabil (2018)tell that drones spy with cameras their private 
life, creating unprecedented levels of fear and intrusion, they implicitly say that they are associated 
by objects in a “network” through circulationof knowledge and power. Such an association is a 
form of “agancement” of passive “actors”in the “network” (the people on the ground). 
“Agancement” is made possible only by the mediator agency power of the “actant” that is the 
drone. Operators without the intermediation of technology would not be able to search terrorists and 
would not be able to penetrate the personal life of the people on the 
ground.Drones“agance”physically and conceptually Palestinians in the“network”of IDF CT 
apparatusfor securitizing, dominating and exerting power over them.On the one hand, conceptually, 
when cameras spy the people on the ground and enroll them in the CT apparatus in order to 
“profile” them, the people on the ground is “aganced” in the “network” through a circulating 
knowledge. While, on the other hand, when drones launch missiles, they “agance”the people on the 
ground physically through translation of material violence. Drones “agance” the people whenever 
necessary, by exploiting their robotic capabilities.As the CT apparatus is continuously in search of 
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potential terrorists the “network” continuously expands and contracts, associating and 
disassociating the subjects on the ground.  
 
2.2 The re-shaped “spatialities” of the battlefield 
 
 
The social-edged margin on which Palestinians feel to be relegated can be seen as ANT “translation 
zone”. A “translation zone” is a space not defined by territorial boundaries, but defined by the 
shifting of scientific and technical practice. It is, in other words, an object-defined space, or a 
topology created by the circulation and flows of the“translation” of power impulses(Barry, 
2013).Indeed, when the “network” extends to the people on the ground thanks to drone agency, it 
constructs and defines new “spatialities”.Such “spatialities” are defined by the extent that drones 
reach with their power of sight and attack into the life of the people on the ground.  
Therefore, drones enact the creation of new political topologies of (in)security. These 
topologiesof (in)securitythat the Palestinians aptly describe in their testimonies, are the places 
where fear and violenceare exported and circulated by the drone. Such topologies are nevertheless 
invisible to the sight of those who look at political spaces following a traditional political scale. As 
a matter of fact, the spaces of (in)security created by drones are hardly visible from a geopolitical 
perspective; but they are, nonetheless, fully political spaces because they are filled with power 
relations. Indeed, the mediating effect of technology renders those spaces power-filled of 
asymmetrical dynamics of fear, domination and violence.Indeed, they are not neutral spaces, 
butthey are created by mono-directional and univocal practices. Drones affect the people on the 
ground by translating impotence, fears, anxieties and a status of threat. As Murdoch (2006, p. 17) 
recognizes “power relations across network space are inevitable double-edges; they can use space to 
facilitate movements and access; equally they can entrench confinement and exclusion”. Drones 
thus reproduce the asymmetric impulses that circulate through the network, fromCT operators down 
to the people on the ground. Such object-defined spacesare controllable spaces where power is 
exerted on an almost scientific basis. Objects, in this case especially drones (but not only drones), 
translate the enormity of state violence into small scalar spaces: the places of everyday life. The 
process of “translation” occurs through different “spatialities” that become what previously in war 
was known as the battlefield. Such “spatialities” can be conceived as a form of re-shaped 
battlefield.Therefore, drones enable operators to fight in an “object-defined” space that is the 
“drone-network battlefield”. Such a re-shaped battlefield has no traditional geographical 
correspondence and is univocally built by the drone CT network alongthe rationalities that regulate 
thecontinuous search for potential terrorists. 
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3. Conclusion: the battlefield as a scientific laboratory 
 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the battlefield in drone warfare is a discontinuous space: 
contracted and extended through the use of technological associations. The battlefield becomes an 
ever-expanding“zone of translation”, that is decided by technologicalcapabilities and human 
willingness. In this zone traditional military reciprocity evidently ceases to exist. Such drone 
battlefield is not always visible and does not pertain to a single geographical scale available. The 
battlefield is place of combat where the associated subjects cannot use “negotiating or resistance” 
tools, as the power exerted is univocal(Murdoch, 2006, p. 80).This is because objects produce 
meanings, practices and effects depending on how they are related to forms and circumstances of 
their use and the sites they are situated (Barry, 2001, p. 21). The battlefield is no more limited to be 
the place where two combatants encounter each other and fight. The battlefield is not the 
Calusewitizan place of “friction and uncertainty”, where the outcome of the battle is tied to 
unpredictable variables of “extreme human decision”(Chamayou and Clausewitz, 2006, p. 84). 
And, the battlefield is no more a contestable space where the rational capacity of the “prince” 
instructed by Clausewitz is the ultimate instrument to win the enemy.  
The battlefield, on the contrary, becomes a multi-topology, dis-placed along the chains 
where violence scientifically circulates and through which technology precisely translates it into 
political practices. The battlefield is reduced, circulated, extended and finally concentrated on the 
human body and its civil, domestic or public surrounding environment. From practices of 
surveillance to practices of killing, objects (drones) allow operators to safely preserve their life by 
dis-placing political violence and bringing it to new topologies, where violence is intimately tested, 
practiced, and, finally, liberated on the people on the ground. IDF targeting of olive tress, as Ahmed 
and Nabil (2018)tell during the interviews, or IDF endowing drones with tear gas to use it against 
civilians, are just few of the examples of how drones are continuously deployed asexperimental 
ways of control and violence. As GregorieChamayou, (2015, p. 203) reminds: “This iswhat Marx 
called a scenario of “war (being) developed earlier than peace”: certain social and economic 
relations are initially developed for military purposes, and only later are they reintroduced and 
developed in order to function ordinarily within civil society. The army serves as a center of 
invention a laboratory experimentation for new political technologies”. Chamayou thinks that from 
such Marx’spostulation it is possible to deduce that armed conflicts are for society “phases of 
experimentation and trial” or, put differently, “social laboratories” where technological processes 
are accelerated and tested for being brought back to society later. In effect, seen as a hybrid network 
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of machines and man, the drone battlefield resembles, thus, a scientific laboratory(Grondin, 2011). 
A space where technologies and humans work hand in hand enacting hybridized forms of precise, 
restricted and continuously experimented violence.A place wherenatural processesare framed and 
encapsulated within technological zones, in order to renderpractices of control, violence andpower 
more and more rapid, precise and scientific.  
 
 
Words’ count: 15091 
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